摘要：許多經(jīng)濟學教科書都認為流轉(zhuǎn)稅一般會造成社會福利的“無謂損失”或“超額負擔”，本文認為，至少在勞動力供應沒有彈性的情況下，這個看法并不準確。本文的一般均衡模型表明，如果所有產(chǎn)品市場均為完全競爭，那么在最優(yōu)的流轉(zhuǎn)稅下，無論是基于“等價變動”或“補償變動”的社會福利損失均為零。如果市場不是完全競爭，那么最優(yōu)的流轉(zhuǎn)稅體系應使得所有產(chǎn)品的勒納指數(shù)(Lerner Index)均等化。并且，最優(yōu)的流轉(zhuǎn)稅一般可實現(xiàn)社會福利的潛在帕累托改進，即稅收的超額負擔為負。

　　關(guān)鍵詞：流轉(zhuǎn)稅，無謂損失，超額負擔，最優(yōu)稅收，不完全競爭

　　Optimal Indirect Tax and Social Welfare

　　Hao Wang

　　Abstract: Many economics textbooks suggest that indirect tax (or excise tax, consumption tax, commodity tax, etc.) usually generates “deadweight loss” or “excess burden” to the society. Using a general equilibrium model, this paper shows that this insight may be incorrect, at least when labor supply is highly inelastic. If all product markets are perfectly competitive, the optimal indirect tax structure is efficient in the sense that it invokes zero welfare loss in term of either “equivalent variation” or “compensating variation”. If not all product markets are competitive, the optimal indirect tax structure should equalize the Lerner indexes of all products, which means governments should impose light taxes on monopolistic firms or industries, but heavy taxes on competitive firms or industries. Furthermore, the optimal indirect tax under imperfect competition generally leads to potential Pareto improvement to the society.

　　Keywords: Indirect tax, Deadweight loss, Excess burden, Optimal tax, Imperfect competition

　　JEL codes：D59, H21, L16

　　點擊下載

相關(guān)熱詞搜索：社會福利 最優(yōu) 流轉(zhuǎn)稅 汪浩