Sino-U.S. relations in 2006 will be characterized by neorealism 　　 　　IN TOUCH: Meetings like this one between John W. Snow, U.S. Treasury Secretary, and Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of China’s central bank, at the G20 meeting, have become frequent among high-profile figures of the two countries recently
　　China’s growing prominence was an important feature of international relations in 2005, as the interaction between China and the outside world drew great attention. As far as Sino-U.S. relations are concerned, while relations were determined largely by Washington’s policy toward China in previous years, the policies of the two governments now tend to have equal weight.
　　In 2005, more and more people came to identify Sino-U.S. relations as the world’s most important bilateral relationship, which will determine whether cooperation or confrontation will dominate international affairs in the 21st century. At the same time, they were stunned by its complexity.
　　Delicate interaction
　　In order to understand the relationship, we need to probe deeply into its background from a broad perspective.
　　The Chinese Government has been going out of its way to stress the wide range of common interests between China and the United States, in the hope of resolving disputes through expanding common interests. Relevant as they are, these efforts are far from adequate. Theoretical studies and the history of international relations have shown that stable relations between major global powers cannot be based merely on shared interests.
　　In fact, many people in the United States have placed greater emphasis on the strategic conflicts and ideological differences between the two countries. I would therefore like to draw attention to this fact: Apart from common interests on the bilateral, regional and global levels, China and the United States share a lot in common in other respects. The two countries are both in the era of globalization. Globalization has resulted in deepened interdependence between countries, which in turn constrains confrontational policies.
　　We are also in an era of nuclear weapons. The destructive capacity of nuclear weapons renders invalid the conventional thinking that all wars are an extension of politics, setting limits to the strategic confrontation of major powers. Heightening non-traditional security risks such as terrorism and natural disasters have broadened the common ground between the two governments. After 27 years of reform aimed at embracing international standards, China’s mainstream values are now close to those of the mainstream world, resulting in a narrowed gap between the two countries’ codes of conduct.
　　Chinese and U.S. societies also share a lot in common, such as their size, evident internal disparities, plural interests, complex structure and overflowing vitality. It can well be said that China has more social similarities to the United States than Japan does. China and the United States are endowed with a lot of cultural similarities, too. For example, both celebrate pragmatism, both mobilize their societies by relying on universally recognized values and both are culturally confident and tolerant.
　　
　　China’s clout is greater than what had been expected.
　　
　　In terms of “hard power,” China’s GDP in 2005 is forecast to exceed $2.2 trillion to rank fourth in the world, accounting for one sixth of the U.S. total. Its total foreign trade volume will surpass $1.4 trillion to rank third in the world, representing half the volume of the United States. If the current growth rates of the two economies remain basically unchanged, China’s GDP is expected to reach $4 trillion, or one quarter of the U.S. volume, by 2010, taking into account the appreciation of its currency. In terms of purchasing power parity, China’s GDP, 60 percent of the U.S. number, already ranks second in the world. In 2005, Chinese universities turned out over 3 million graduates, 2.5 times the number of U.S. graduates. Among these, 600,000 majored in engineering, 10 times the figure of their U.S. counterparts.
　　In terms of “soft power,” China succeeded in its elite integration in the 1990s, a move that had similar political implications as U.S. mainstream society’s admission of non-mainstream elites in the 1960s and 1970s. The integration strengthened the ruling party’s power base and the country’s political stability. China has also shaped a sound external environment as well as a pluralistic society within. Openness and pluralism constitute real advantages for the country. In addition, with China’s modernization more clear in sight, the Chinese have come to realize that there will be both distinctions and connections between modernization and Western culture. They have begun to reexamine Chinese cultural traditions, thereby forging a stronger sense of attachment to their native country and culture.
　　
　　A high cost
　　
　　The weaknesses of the United States have become evident. The presidential election in 2004 highlighted U.S. political polarization. Conservatives attempted to restore the dominance of a mainstream society, only to be frustrated by structural obstacles. Samuel P. Huntington’s book Who Are We embodies mainstream U.S. elites’ concern about the future national identity and solidarity.
　　Hurricane Katrina in 2005 revealed the deep social divide in the United States, where the First World and Third World coexist. “Virtualization” in the past 30 years has led to economic vulnerability in the United States, as evidenced by its exceedingly high dependence on international capital and economists’ worries about possible financial risks.
　　U.S. economy relies heavily on the supremacy of the dollar, which in turn depends on the supreme status of the country. As a result of this vicious circle, maintaining world supremacy not only has a bearing on its immediate interests, but also is of vital importance to the country. However, the antiterrorism dilemma shows that preserving supreme status is becoming an ever-more-costly endeavor.
　　Ever since the September 11 events, Washington has had to pay staggering prices for both public goods and security so as to sustain supremacy. Despite this, its supreme status makes it a major target for terrorists. U.S. counterattack on Islamic extremists has triggered conflicts between the United States and the Islamic world. Embroiled in the clash between civilizations, Washington will have to struggle to find a way out.
　　Moreover, the United States has run into ideological problems. For example, it takes a romantic, simplistic view of democracy. Overlooking the complexity in the theory and practice of democracy, the United States exports democracy as part of its ideology. As a matter of fact, the third wave of democracy driven by the United States is largely over. Unfortunately, mainstream U.S. society still clings to that mentality, despite a few political elites’ initial reconsideration of that strategy.
　　In addition, Washington has a wrong perception of the Cold War, which was ended because of the failure of the Soviet Union, rather than the triumph of the United States. The U.S. victory only came as its result. However, many in the United States tend to confuse the cause with the effect, which are, of course, fundamentally different. This misinterpretation may lead to inflated confidence, arrogance, then improper behaviors and finally conflicts with others.
　　All the intricacies cited above were thrust into the spotlight in 2005, giving rise to different attitudes toward China in the United States. For all the policy vacilations, U.S. authorities have eventually embraced neo-realism in regard to U.S.-China relations.
　　Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick’s remarks on bilateral relations marked the advent of neo-realism. In his speech, Zoellick noted that the goal pursued by the past seven U.S. presidents--integrating China into the international community--had materialized with China’s joining the international system as a full member. He therefore issued a new appeal, calling on China to become a “responsible stakeholder” that shoulders the responsibilities of a major global player and works together with the United States.
　　The main features of the U.S. neo-realism include: facing up to China’s development; affirming that China, unlike the Soviet Union, is not to be dealt with through containment; acknowledging the complexity of Chinese society and Sino-U.S. relations, or the multiple possibilities for the development of bilateral relations; and demanding that China bear greater responsibilities as a major power by labeling the country a “stakeholder,” thus shaping China’s future character and behavior pattern and steering Sino-U.S. relations toward its desired direction.
　　Chinese scholars of international affairs generally made positive comments about Zoellick’s speech, the same with the Chinese Government. Last December, the State Council Information Office released a white paper titled “China’s Peaceful Development Road” to elaborate on the country’s peaceful development philosophy.
　　Washington’s realistic approach speaks of its attempts to seek a new framework for future Sino-U.S. relations. Adopting a responsive stance, China has made it possible for the new framework to materialize. At present, chances to forge stable long-term bilateral relations have emerged, and 2006 is a crucial year. Whether the two governments can seize the opportunities to establish a long-term framework depends on the development of bilateral relations in 2006 to a large extent.
　　President Hu Jintao’s upcoming U.S. trip is expected to bring good news. The visit is poised to promote strategic communications and mutual trust between the two countries and to strengthen overall bilateral relations. In addition, strategic or senior dialogues between the two countries will continue. The previous two rounds have produced constructive results. The strategically significant mechanism, when institutionalized, will serve as an essential guarantee for the stable development of Sino-U.S. relations in the future.
　　
　　Not all rosy
　　
　　However, U.S. policy toward China is two-pronged. While seeking closer ties, it has a strong strategic doubt about China. In diplomatic practice, Washington sticks to the strategy of “hedging engagement.” This duality will become the biggest obstacle hindering bilateral ties over the long haul.
　　Problems confronting the two countries in 2006 include at least the following:
　　China and the United States hold different positions on East Asian cooperation. It is an established foreign policy of China to expand all-around cooperation with its neighbors in East Asia. However, Washington is too cautious about Beijing’s growing influence in the region. It was apathetic toward the first East Asia Summit held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia last December, because of its distrust about Beijing’s regional cooperation policy. To tackle the problem, Beijing needs to make every effort to demonstrate its welcoming stance to U.S. presence in East Asia, while Washington should recognize Beijing’s right to promote regional cooperation conducive to the overall interests of the region.
　　Japan will become an increasingly important factor affecting Sino-U.S. relations. The United States has made it plain that it will help boost Japan’s role in political and security affairs in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan alliance was expanded with two “two plus two” meetings of foreign affairs and defense chiefs held in February and October 2005. The sticking point is that Japan, taking advantage of U.S. strategic support, has taken preemptive actions to provoke China. However, as lasting tension between the two is not in its long-term interests, Washington has shown concern over this problem.
　　The nuclear issues in North Korea and Iran are expected to become even more pressing. The United States will prompt China to assume more obligations in these regards.
　　In the energy field, leaders in Beijing and Washington have shown interest in cooperation. However, there is still a formidable political force in Washington touting the “China threat” rhetoric by citing energy concerns.
　　The New Year message of Taiwan leader Chen Shui-bian was replete with confrontational logic, signaling potential crises in cross-strait relations in 2006.
　　The trade problem will surely get worse. According to U.S. statistics, U.S. trade deficit with China will reach $200 billion, a gap that is set to precipitate U.S. politicization of the trade issue.
　　As the U.S. midterm election unfolds in 2006, domestic politics is likely to have a greater bearing on Sino-U.S. relations.
　　Despite the inconsistency in U.S. policy toward China and the myriad problems haunting the two countries, it is predictable that their relations will be characterized by stable and sound development in 2006. It is important to note that while growing in power, China upholds its foreign policy of peace and seeks cooperation in Sino-U.S. relations. As Beijing has been able to take a greater initiative in bilateral relations, the two sides begin to enter a stage where they shape each other’s policies.
　　The peaceful diplomacy that China pursues means its development will contribute to the stability of Sino-U.S. relations. Today, China is basically satisfied with the current international order, and the Chinese people are generally friendly to the United States, something that is good for the rest of the world, especially for the United States.
　　

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